Michigan Law Review
Volume 86

Issue 6

1988

Natural Law and Justice
Heidi Li Feldman
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Natural Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Heidi L. Feldman, Natural Law and Justice, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1988).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol86/iss6/41

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

By Lloyd L. Weinreb. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 320. $25.

NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE.

In the preface to Natural Law and Justice, Lloyd L. Weinreb 1 •
poses two questions: "What is the dispute between natural law and
legal positivism?" and "What does the idea of justice add to the ideas
of liberty and equality fully considered?" (p. vii). Ultimately, Weinreb
attempts to answer these questions by demonstrating the relationship
between them - th~oretically, a worthwhile exegetical technique. But
the promise of a simultaneous and mutual explication of the two questions disappears into two separate quasi-historical analyses of theories
of natural law and justice. Weinreb never elucidates the purpose of
asking the two questions together in the first place.
Weinreb hopes to show that each of the two questions rests on
conceptual antinomies endemic to their subject matter and parallel to
one another. The controversy between natural law and legal positivism arises from the inevitable clash between freedom and causation;
when justice confronts liberty and equality two further antinomies result: the contest between desert and entitlement precludes a satisfactory account of individual justice, and the tension between liberty and
equality precludes such an account of social justice. In all of these
antinomies, argues Weinreb, each part requires the other if either is to
be understood - but a full comprehension of either half defeats the
possibility of a rich notion of the other. For instance, any concept of
entitlement depends on one of desert, but the full development of
either concept displaces the other entirely. Weinreb devotes most of
Natural Law and Justice to explicating this situation for each antinomy. Unfortunately, such tensions and even the parallels between
them are standard fare in political philosophy. 2 Weinreb fails to capitalize on the novel aspect of the two main questions he considers: the
implications that each question has for the other.
In part 1 of Natural Law and Justice, Weinreb attempts to reestablish natural law as a viable legal theory. Historically, natural law the1. Lloyd L. Weinreb is Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Professor Weinreb's areas of
specialization include criminal law, criminal procedure, and jurisprudence. He is also the author
of DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1977) and CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1987).
2. In fact, many works address Weinreb's concerns, although from a variety of perspectives.
For a sampling, see generally I. BERLIN, FOUR EssAYS ON LIBERTY (1969) (a seminal discussion
of apparently incompatible conceptions of freedom); Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Lib·
erty. in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 175 (A. Ryan ed. 1979) (a rebuttal of Berlin's preferred version
of freedom); M. SCHLICK, PROBLEMS OF ETHICS, ch. VII (1939) (denying that the question of
free will presents a serious philosophical difficulty); Campbell, Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem,
in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 173 (H. Morris ed. 1961) (reasserting the problematic nature
of free will). See also R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
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orists sought to discover or to justify human sovereign law by
reference to an a priori legal order posited by God and evidenced by
nature. With the post-Enlightenment collapse of religious worldviews, such theories seemed implausible. Thus came the advent of
legal positivism. Positivism ultimately validates human law self-referentially;3 Weinreb maintains that this circularity fails to ensure the
morality of law (p. 99). Instead, he urges a modern natural law theory
that would reconnect law and morality by regarding as law only that
which fits within a preexisting normative order (pp. 101-26).
To develop this argument, Weinreb attempts to provide the reader
with an understanding of natural law, and its beef with positivism, by
tracing the conceptual development of natural law from ancient
Greece to contemporary natural law theory. This whirlwind sweeps
the reader through ancient Rome (discussing by name obscure Roman
lawyers), medieval England (including such esoteric figures as John
Duns Scotus and William of Ockham), and the Enlightenment (devoting subsections to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau). Although Weinreb
highlights the aspects of natural law he perceives as continuous
throughout the tour, the sheer number of stops does not allow a reader
unfamiliar with the terrain a chance to formulate an overall view of
the subject. Because Weinreb claims that his emphasis is not historical
(p. 8), he should have reduced his attention to particular historical
figures, and instead presented his own understanding of natural law,
supplemented ·by references to the ideas he learned from his historical
scholarship. In this way, the reader could proceed to the book's second half with the first digested, ready to grasp the parallels crucial to
Weinreb's method.
In part 2 of the book, Weinreb discusses his second question and
turns to justice as the cornerstone of the normative order he seeks.
Weinreb tries to find a framework to accommodate both liberty and
equality. This framework would, in turn, support his brand of natural
law. To explore his second question, Weinreb shifts the focus of his
technique from historical coverage to analysis of contemporary American political philosophers, particularly John Rawls, Robert Nozick,
Alasdair Macintyre, and Michael Sandel. By diminishing the number
of philosophers surveyed, Weinreb alleviates some of the rapid-fire effect found in the historical section. Still, the tension of attempting to
make his own case via the works of others produces another difficulty
reminiscent of those in the first part. Weinreb needs to prove his claim
that justice contains an ineradicable antimony between desert and entitlement on the individual level, and liberty and equality on the social
level. Thus he critiques the leading liberal and communitarian ac3. For example: A particular piece of legislation is legally binding if and only if it is enacted
constitutionally; and the constitution is legal because it was ratified according to proper procedure ..• and so forth.
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counts of justice, hoping to show both the presence of the antimony
and the respective theorists' inevitable failure to resolve it. In these
critiques, however, Weinreb seems more to be capitalizing on others'
works to identify the concerns underlying his own project, than to be
discovering tensions truly implicit in the works he appraises.
Weinreb's treatment of Rawls illustrates this tendency. 4 Weinreb
argues that Rawls's theory of justice reduces justice exclusively to entitlement; by eliminating desert from justice, claims Weinreb, "Rawls's
theory diminishes the person - the area of personhood - by excluding personal characteristics that are ordinarily regarded as constitutive" (p. 238). In other words, the "autonomy that remains [to the
Rawlsian person] is an abstraction that attaches to a 'noumenal' self
unrelated to the incidents of our actual lives" (p. 223). These claims
depend upon a disputable reading of Rawls, particularly in light of
Rawls's recent writings. 5 Regardless of Rawls's latest work, however,
Weinreb's claims seem to disregard elements of Rawls's initial theory
of justice such as the thin theory of the good6 and the idea of social
union, 7 which support Rawls's claim that "moral personality is characterized by two capacities: one for a conception of the good, the
other for a sense of justice." 8 Rawlsian theory does not preclude consideration of the experiences and attachments of our actual lives. In
fact, these experiences constitute half of the foundation for the Rawlsian framework. Rawls's plan for justice must be constructed by
selves with moral personality, and moral personality requires a conception of the good. In the end, this conception stems from the overlapping experiences of actual people. The capacity for a conception of
the good depends upon just those characteristics Weinreb claims
Rawls's theory fails to accommodate. Rather than consider all of
4. This review addresses only Weinreb's analysis of Rawls, although his treatments of
Nozick, Macintyre, and Sandel suffer from similar flaws.
5. See Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987);
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & Pue. AFF. 223 (1985); Rawls,
Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 159 (A. Sen & B. Williams
eds. 1982); Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. (1980); Rawls, The Basic
Structure as Subject, in VALUES AND MORALS 47 (A. Goldman & J. Kim eds. 1978).
6. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 399-416 (1971). The possibility ofa "thin" theory
of the good gets Rawls's entire theory off the ground. He proposes and defends a "morally
neutral" understanding of the good, whereby people with little specific knowledge of themselves
or others can still evaluate the goodness of various entities based on their common knowledge of
the world. Rawls offers as an example the functional appraisal of a watch: if one knows what a
watch is, one can formulate a basic idea of the qualities of a good watch. The thin theory of the
good depends precisely on our actual experiences. Id. at 401.
7. Id. at 520-29. With the idea of a social union, Rawls acknowledges the importance of the
good of community within a pluralistic theory of justice. Arguing that "human sociability" is
essential to meaningful lives, Rawls awards a high priority to association. His rejection of community as the basis for a theory of justice does not imply that the actual people covered by the
theory are "noumenal selves" forever alienated from one another.

8. Id. at 561.

May 1988]

Law, Philosophy, and Literature

1469

Rawls's theory, Weinreb merely isolates those aspects that generate
support for his antinomies.
Not only is Weinreb's discussion of Rawls objectionable; his criticism of Rawls exposes a deeper problem in his own book. Weinreb's
fundamental criticism of Rawls has serious implications for Rawls's
theory of personal identity (pp. 237-38). Yet Weinreb himself declares
that although the "problems of personal identity and the minimum
criteria of personhood are complex and notoriously difficult ... it does
not seem necessary to embark on them here" (p. 236). In the process
of using Rawls to buttress his sketch of the antinomies inherent in any
conception of justice, Weinreb pinpoints another - possibly more insightful - area of debate. Then, however, he immediately abbreviates
any discussion of the problem of personal identity.
This failure to pursue an emergent and innovative line of thought
due to preoccupation with the antinomies manifests itself on a larger
scale in the final chapter of Natural Law and Justice (pp. 224-65).
Here, after having followed Weinreb -through the explication of three
sets of antinomies, we expect him to derive from his explication some
substantive, meaningful conclusions. Instead he traces the parallels between the antinomies and concludes that they are indeed irreconcilable
- at least until a "transformation" of our understanding of our own
experience occurs (p. 265). But the irreconcilability of the antinomies
between freedom and causation, desert and entitlement, and liberty
and equality are nothing new in political philosophy - or in the practice of law - and Weinreb remains mute as to what such a "transformation" of our understanding of experience could possibly mean. Nor
does he explain why it will "be the product of accumulated facts and a
slowly accumulating shift in the fundamental conceptual system by
which facts are ordered" (p. 265). Although Weinreb's claim is appealing, and in line with some key contemporary social philosophy, 9
his failure to clinch his position makes it difficult to discern the point
of Natural Law and Justice; we remain hung up on the brink of an
interesting argument that Weinreb never develops.

- Heidi Li Feldman
9. See generally 1 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1981);
Habermas, Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 130 (1979); Taylor, Social Theory as Practice, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND
THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 91 (1985). Both Habermas and Taylor, as
well as Rawls in his more recent work, assert a connection between theory and practice and
develop some account of the relationship between them.

